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Abstract
We consider ǫ-equilibria notions for constant value of ǫ in n-player m-actions games
where m is a constant. We focus on the following question: What is the largest grid size
over the mixed strategies such that ǫ-equilibrium is guaranteed to exist over this grid.
For Nash equilibrium, we prove that constant grid size (that depends on ǫ and m,
but not on n) is sufficient to guarantee existence of weak approximate equilibrium. This
result implies a polynomial (in the input) algorithm for weak approximate equilibrium.
For approximate Nash equilibrium we introduce a closely related question and prove
its equivalence to the well-known Beck-Fiala conjecture from discrepancy theory. To the
best of our knowledge this is the first result introduces a connection between game theory
and discrepancy theory.
For correlated equilibrium, we prove a O( 1
logn
) lower-bound on the grid size, which
matches the known upper bound of Ω( 1
logn
). Our result implies an Ω(logn) lower bound
on the rate of convergence of dynamics (any dynamic) to approximate correlated (and
coarse correlated) equilibrium. Again, this lower bound matches the O(log n) upper
bound that is achieved by regret minimizing algorithms.
1 Introduction
The algorithmic aspect of equilibria has been studied extensively from the moment when
the concept of Nash equilibrium [10] was introduced, and mainly in the past three decades
[8, 13, 6, 14]. A naive approach for computation of approximate Nash equilibrium in normal
form games is the following:
- Set a “dense enough grid” of the strategy profiles, such that approximate Nash equi-
librium is guaranteed to exist on this grid.
- Exhaustively search over all grid points whether it forms an approximate Nash equilib-
rium.
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Despite the extensive study of equilibrium computation and the naivety of the above algo-
rithm, no better algorithm for computation of approximate equilibrium is known (except for
special classes of games, e.g., [7]). Surprisingly, the above algorithm is known to be optimal
for games with constant number of players (under the exponential hypothesis for the PPAD
class), see [14]. We show an additional case where this algorithm is optimal (see Corollary
1).
This motivates the study of the question: how dense should the grid of the strategy
profiles be in order to guarantee existence of approximate equilibrium over the grid. A
standard notion that captures the grid’s density is the following.
Definition 1. A probability distribution µ ∈ ∆(B) is called k-uniform if it is uniform
distribution over a multi-set of B of size k, or equivalently, if for every b ∈ B we have
µ(b) = ck for some c ∈ Z.
The class of grids (over the mixed strategies) that is considered in the present paper is
the class of k-uniform distributions, and its density is determined by k. The larger k is, the
denser the grid is.
The main question of the present paper can be formulates as follows:
Question 1: Given an ǫ-equilibrium solution concept, for which values of k = k(ǫ, n,m) exis-
tence of k-uniform ǫ-equilibrium is guaranteed for every n-player m-action game? More con-
cretely, we will be interested in understanding the asymptotic behaviour of limn→∞ k(ǫ, n,m)
when we set m and ǫ as fixed constants.
The dependence of k = k(ǫ, n,m) on the number of actions m has a neat characterization
of k = Θ(logm) [11, 1]. However, the dependence on the number of players n is less under-
stood: It is known that the dependence is at most O(log n) (see [2]), but no lower bounds
were known (neither for Nash equilibria nor for correlated equilibria). The present paper
aims to close these gaps. The established results have implications to equilibria computation,
and to rate of convergence of learning dynamics.
1.1 Main results
1.1.1 Approximate Nash equilibria
Here, by k-uniform approximate Nash equilibrium we refer to an action profile where every
player uses a k-uniform strategy. The best known upper bound for ǫ-Nash equilibrium is
k = O(log n), see [2]. The question whether k = O(1) suffices is an interesting open ques-
tion and we address it here. In Theorem 1 we prove that for the weaker notion of weak
approximate equilibrium indeed k = O(1) suffices. This result implies a polynomial (in the
input) algorithm for computing weak approximate Nash equilibrium. To the best of our
knowledge, no previous results have demonstrated the existence of polynomial algorithm for
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any approximate notion of Nash equilibrium in normal form games. It is interesting to note
that the query complexity of weak approximate Nash equilibrium is polynomial (in the in-
put), [14]. Thus, a sub-polynomial algorithm for weak approximate equilibrium is impossible.
Hence, again, as in the two-player case, the naive exhaustive search algorithm is proved to
be optimal.
Unfortunately, we did not succeeded to prove or disprove whether k = O(1) suffices for the
standard notion of ǫ-Nash equilibrium (or an ǫ-well supported Nash equilibrium). However,
we do gain some incites about a closely related question: whether there exists an approximate
Nash equilibrium on the grid that is “close to” an exact equilibrium.
A natural approach to prove an existence of approximate equilibrium is to search for one
near-by an exact equilibrium. More concretely, consider a binary-action game (m = 2) with
an exact Nash equilibrium x = (xi)i∈[n] ∈ [0, 1]n, where xi is the probability of playing the first
action. The equilibrium x belongs to a 1k -cube on the grid x ∈ Ckx = [ c1k , c1+1k ]×...×[ cnk , cn+1k ].
Question 2: For which values of k it is guaranteed that for every game and every exact
equilibrium x one of the vertices of Ckx will be an ǫ-Nash equilibrium?
In Proposition 1 we show that for k = O(
√
log n) there exists a game with a binary action
for each player and a unique equilibrium x such that all points in Ckx are not approximate
Nash equilibria. Moreover, all approximate Nash equilibria on the grid (although exist) are
located “very far” from the equilibrium: There exist players who play a certain pure strategy
in the exact equilibrium and the opposite strategy in any approximate well supported Nash
equilibrium on the grid.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that finding close approximate equilibrium for k = O(1) is
impossible for all games. Thus we restrict attention to particular classes of games and ask
the following question:
Question 3: Given a class of games, is it guaranteed that for every exact equilibrium x one
of the vertices of Ckx will be an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, for k = O(1)?
An interesting observation is that for some classes of games answering Question 3 is (prob-
ably) mathematically very challenging: We introduce a class of games for which Question
3 is equivalent1 to the well known Beck-Fiala conjecture (since 1981) in discrepancy theory
[3, 12, 5], see Theorem 3. To the best of our knowledge Theorem 3 is the first result that
establishes a connection between game theory and discrepancy theory.
1In fact, we prove the equivalence for some concrete instances of the Beck-Fiala conjecture of approximately-
(up to a constant factor)-balanced matrices, see Section 4.1. By considering closely related question to Beck-
Fiala conjecture where the answer is known, it is reasonable to believe that these concrete instances are ”the
hardest”. We should note that no one have proved or disproved the Beck-Fiala conjecture for these instances.
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1.1.2 Approximate correlated equilibria
Since a correlated equilibrium is a distribution over the action profiles, here a k-uniform
distribution means a uniform distribution over k action profiles.
A k = O(log n) upper bound was proved to be sufficient for existence of ǫ-correlated
equilibrium, see [2]. In fact, regret minimizing algorithms converge to an ǫ-correlated equi-
librium in a rate of O(log n) [4, 9]. This provides an alternative proof for the existence of
such k-uniform approximate correlated equilibrium. In Theorem 4 we prove a lower bound of
k = Ω(log n). This result shows that no dynamic can converge to an approximate correlated
equilibrium faster than in Ω(log n) steps, which shows the optimality, in the rate of conver-
gence, of the regret minimizing dynamics. We note that it was known that regret minimizing
dynamics cannot converge faster than in Ω(log n) steps. Our result shows that no dynamic
at all can converge faster.
We also note that if we restrict attention to the notion of (ǫ, δ)-weak approximate corre-
lated equilibrium: i.e., a distribution over the profiles such that 1− δ fraction of players are
ǫ-best replying, then there exists a k-uniform weak approximate correlated equilibrium for
k = O(1). This observation is similar to the Nash equilibrium case.
2 Preliminaries
An n-player m-action game consist of a set of players [n], with an action set [m], and a payoff
function ui : [m]
n → [0, 1] for every player i. Let ∆(B) denote the set of all probability
distributions over the set B. The set of mixed strategies of player i is denoted by ∆([m]).
The set of correlated strategies is ∆([m]n). The utility function of player i can be naturally
extended to mixed strategy profiles ui : (∆([m]))
n → R and to correlated strategies ui :
∆([m]n)→ R as the expected payoff under the given distributions. Given a profile of (mixed)
actions x = (xi) we denote by x−i the profile of actions of player’s i opponents, namely
x−i = (x1, ..., xi−1, xi+1, ..., xn).
Definition 2. Approximate Nash equilibrium. A profile of mixed actions (xi)i∈[n] where
xi ∈ ∆([m]) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than ǫ by a unilateral
deviation. Namely, ui(xi, x−i) ≥ ui(ai, x−i)− ǫ for every player i and every action ai ∈ [m].
Definition 3. Weak approximate Nash equilibrium. A profile of mixed actions (xi)i∈[n]
where xi ∈ ∆([m]) is an (ǫ, δ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium if at least 1− δ fraction of
the players cannot gain more than ǫ by a unilateral deviation.
Definition 4. (Approximately) Individually rational payoffs. The individually ratio-
nal level of player i is the maximal number vi that he can guarantee (using mixed strategies)
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against any action of the opponents. Namely
vi = max
xi∈∆([m])
min
a−i∈[m]n−1
ui(xi, a−i).
A correlated distribution x ∈ ∆([m]n) is ǫ-individually rational if ui(x) ≥ vi − ǫ.
There are several notions of correlated equilibria and approximate correlated equilibria,
arguably the strongest notion of approximate correlated equilibrium is the following.
Definition 5. Approximate correlated equilibrium. A correlated distribution x ∈
∆([m]n) is an ǫ-correlated equilibrium if
Ea∼x[ui(a)] ≥ Ea∼x[ui(f(ai), a−i)]− ǫ
for every player i and every switching function f : [m]→ [m].
The intuition behind this notion comes from the idea that a correlated strategy x can
be implemented by a mediator who draws an action profile a = (ai)i∈[n] according to x and
recommends every player i to use ai. If no player can gain more than ǫ by deviating from
mediator’s recommendation (namely to play action f(j) every time mediator recommends j)
then the distribution x is an ǫ-correlated equilibrium.
Approximate correlated equilibrium also has a weak analogue of the solution.
Definition 6. Weak approximately correlated equilibrium. A correlated distribution
x ∈ ∆([m]n) is an (ǫ, δ)-weak approximate correlated equilibrium if
Ea∼x[ui(a)] ≥ Ea∼x[ui(f(ai), a−i)]− ǫ
for every switching function f : [m]→ [m] for at least (1− δ)-fraction of the players.
We would like to note that ǫ-individual rationality is the weakest possible notion for
solutions that require rationality from all players (unlike weak approximate correlated equi-
librium for instance). In particular the set of approximately individually rational distribu-
tions contains the set of approximate correlated equilibria and approximate coarse correlated
equilibria.
3 Weak approximate Nash equilibrium
Theorem 1. Every n-player m-actions game admits a k-uniform (ǫ, δ)-weak approximate
Nash equilibrium for every k ≥ 32(ln 8+lnm−ln ǫ−ln δ)
ǫ2
.
The important property of the bound on k is the fact that it does not depend on n. A
straightforward corollary from Theorem 1 is the existence of polynomial algorithm for weak
approximate equilibrium.
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Corollary 1. For constant ǫ, δ > 0 and m ∈ N there exists a poly(N) algorithm that
computes an (ǫ, δ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium in every n-player m-action game,
where N = n ·mn is the input size (the size of the game).
Proof of Corollary 1. The algorithm exhaustively search for an (ǫ, δ)-weak approximate Nash
equilibrium over all the k-uniform profiles, for k = 32(ln 8+lnm−ln ǫ−ln δ)
ǫ2
. The number of k-
uniform mixed actions of a single player is bounded by km. Thus, the number of k-uniform
action profiles is bounded by
(km)n = (mn)
m log k
logm ≤ N m log klogm = poly(N)
Note that the algorithm is guaranteed to find an (ǫ, δ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium
by Theorem 1.
The proof of Theorem 1 uses similar technique to the one developed in [2]. We prove
that after constant number of samples from an exact Nash equilibrium distribution, with
positive probability the sampled mixed action profile forms an (ǫ, δ)-weak approximate Nash
equilibrium. We rely on the following concentration inequality for product distributions that
was derived in [2].
Given a discrete probability space (Ω, µ) we denote by µ(k) ∈ ∆(Ω) the random dis-
tribution that is obtained by taking the average of k i.i.d. samples from µ. Namely,
µ(k)(ω) = 1k
∑
i 1xi=ω when x1, ..., xk ∼ µ are i.i.d. random variables.
Theorem 2 ([2]). Let (Ω1, µ1), ..., (Ωn, µn) be discrete probability spaces. Consider the
product space (Ω = ΠiΩi, µ = Πiµi). For every ǫˆ > 0, k ∈ N, and f : Ω→ [0, 1] we have
P(|E
Πiµ
(k)
i
[f ]− Eµ[f ]| > ǫˆ) ≤ 4e
−(ǫˆ2/8)k
ǫˆ
Proof of Theorem 1. Let x = (xi)i∈[n] be a Nash equilibrium of the game. We denote ski =
x
(k)
i the mixed action of player i that is obtained by sampling k i.i.d. draws from xi.
Setting f = ui and ǫˆ =
ǫ
2 in Theorem 2 implies that
P(|ui(ai, sk−i)− ui(ai, x−i)| ≥ ǫ) ≤
8e−(ǫ
2/32)k
ǫ
for every player i ∈ [n] and every action ai ∈ [m]. The choice of k guarantees that
8e−(ǫ
2/32)k
ǫ
<
δ
m
.
Using the union bound, we get that for every player i with probability greater than 1− δ we
have |ui(ai, sk−i)− ui(ai, x−i)| ≤ ǫ2 for all actions ai ∈ [m]. We denote the above event by gi.
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Note that the event gi is a sufficient condition for player i to ǫ-best reply at the profile (s
k
i )i,
because
ui(ai, s
k
−i) ≤ ui(ai, x−i) +
ǫ
2
≤
∑
a′i∈Ai
ski (a
′
i)ui(a
′
i, x−i) +
ǫ
2
≤
∑
a′i∈Ai
ski (a
′
i)ui(a
′
i, s
k
−i) + ǫ = ui(s
k
i , s
k
−i) + ǫ.
Since each one of the events gi happen with probability of at least 1 − δ there exists a
realization (ski )i such that at least (1− δ) fraction of the events gi happen. Such a realization
(ski )i is an (ǫ, δ)-weak approximate Nash equilibrium.
4 Approximate Nash equilibrium
We consider games with binary actions where player’s mixed strategy is a real number xi ∈
[0, 1]. For clarity of presentation, we assume that k is odd, and therefore the mixed strategy
1
2 is
1
2k -away from both closest points on the grid:
k−1
2k and
k+1
2k . This assumption is for
clarity of presentation only: For even values of k we can slightly change the payoffs in the
constructed games such that the exact equilibrium will appear at the point k+12k . Here, again,
we have a situation where the two closest points on the grid, 12 and
k+2
2k , are
1
2k away from
the exact equilibrium.
We recall that given an equilibrium x we denote by Ckx = [
c1
k ,
c1+1
k ] × ... × [ cnk , cn+1k ] the
1
k -cube where the equilibrium x is located.
Proposition 1. There exists an n-player binary-action with a unique exact Nash equilibrium
x, such that for k <
√
logn
8 non of the points on the grid that are close to x (namely the set
Ckx) form a 0.1-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the following game with 2b +
(2b
b
)
players. b pairs of players are playing
matching-pennies with each other, we denote these players by 1, 2, ..., 2b and call them the
matching-pennies players. Each one of the remaining
(2b
b
)
is characterized by a set S ⊂ [2b],
and we call them the observing players. Player S has to guess whether the amount of players
that will play 1 in S is close to b2 . More formally, player S has two strategies 0 and 1. His
utility is given by
u(0, aS) = 0.5 (independently of aS),
u(1, aS) =


1 if b2 − 2
√
b ≤∑i∈S ai ≤ b2 + 2
√
b
0 otherwise.
The unique exact equilibrium of this game is where all matching-pennies players are playing
(12 ,
1
2) and all the observing players are playing 1. The latter follows from the fact that the
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amount of 1’s is distributed according to a binomial distribution Bin(b, 12) ≈ N ( b2 , b4). The
probability that this amount will be in the segment [ b2 −
√
b, b2 +
√
b] is 1− 2Φ(−2) > 0.94.
Consider now the case where the matching-pennies players are restricted to actions on
an odd grid of size k =
√
b
4 . More importantly, every player is playing a mixed strategy that
is 2√
b
-away from 12 . There exists a set S such that all players in S are either (all) playing
a mixed strategy above 12 or (all) are playing a mixed strategy below
1
2 . W.l.o.g., assume
that the latter happen. Note that the amount of 1s for this specific set S is a distribution
with expectation of at least µ ≥ b(12 + 4√b) =
b
2 + 2
√
b, and a variance of at most σ2 ≤ b4 .
By the Central Limit Theorem2, the probability that the amount of 1’s are in the segment
(−∞, b2 +
√
b] is at most Φ(−2) < 0.03. Therefore player S must play 1 with probability of
at most 0.10.47 < 0.22 in a 0.1-Nash equilibrium, which is far from his pure strategy 1 in the
exact equilibrium.
To conclude, the total number of players in the game is n = 2b+
(2b
b
) ≤ 22b, and for odd
grid of size k <
√
log(n)
8 all approximate equilibria on the grid are far from the unique exact
equilibrium.
4.1 The connection to discrepancy theory
The basic question that is considered in discrepancy theory is the following: Given a 0, 1
matrix M of size n ×m, how close to 0 can one make the sum of (all) rows by multiplying
the columns by3 {1,−1}. More formally, we define
disc(M) = min
χ∈{1,−1}m
||Mχ||∞.
The classical ”Six standard deviations suffice” Theorem by Spencer [15] states that for
m ≥ n and for every matrix M we have disc(M) ≤ 6√n. For the case where the matrix is
sparse namely each column contains at most t 1s Back and Fiala conjectured that disc(M) =
O(
√
t) (independently of n and m) [3].
A particular case of Back-Fiala conjecture is the case of balanced matrices (up to a
constant factor).
Given a matrix M ∈ {0, 1}n×m we denote ri =
∑
j∈[m]Mi,j for every i ∈ [n] and cj =∑
i∈[n]Mi,j for every j ∈ [m] the number of 1s in each row and column.
Definition 7. A matrix M ∈ {0, 1}n×m is called α-balanced if 1α ≤ cicj ≤ α, 1α ≤
ri
rj
≤ α, and
1
α ≤ ricj ≤ α for every pair of rows/ columns.
2Here and in the proof of Theorem 3 we rely on the powerful Central limit Theorem. Similar arguments
can be done by using the less powerful Chebishev’s inequality.
3The same question has an elegant equivalent formulation through two-coloring of elements in set systems.
8
Conjecture 1. α-balanced Beck-Fiala conjecture. For every α-balanced matrix M
holds disc(M) = O(
√
t) where t = r1 (or alternatively the sum of any other row or column).
There are evidences to believe that the α-balanced conjecture is not significantly simpler
than the original conjecture, because for similar problems where tight lower bounds are known
(for instance Spencer’s Theorem [15]) the lower bounds satisfy balanceness.
We consider the class of majority matching-pennies games. A majority matching-pennies
game is characterized by a matrix M ∈ {0, 1}n×m, and it consists of n + m players. Each
row/column player has two actions {1,−1}, and he should decide whether to multiply all the
elements in his row/column by −1. The utility of every row player is given by:
• 1 if the sum of numbers in his row is positive (after we take into account his action and
the actions of his column opponents).
• 0 if the sum of numbers in his row is 0.
• −1 if the sum of numbers in his row is negative.
The utilities of every column player is the opposite of the row players:
• −1 if the sum of numbers in his row is positive.
• 0 if the sum of numbers in his row is 0.
• 1 if the sum of numbers in his row is negative.
We call these games majority matching-pennies since they are equivalent to a bipartite
polymatrix game where row player i interacting with column player j in a matching pennies
game iff Mi,j = 1. Unlike standard polymiatrix games where players receive the sum of
payoffs, here players receive the sign of the sum of payoffs.
Note that the profile of actions where every player is playing (12 ,
1
2) is an exact equilibrium
in every majority matching-pennies game.
A subclass of majority matching-pennies games is α-balanced majority matching pennies
games where the matrix M is α-balanced.
Conjecture 2. Existence of close approximate equilibrium equilibrium, for α-
balanced games. There exists a global constant k = k(α) such that one of the 2n+m
profiles of the form (k±12k )
n+m is a 0.4-Nash equilibrium.
Now we are ready to state the equivalence of approximate equilibria and the discrepancy
result.
Theorem 3. For every constant α, Conjecture 1 is equivalent to Conjecture 2.
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Although Theorem 3 demonstrates a connection between Back-Fiala conjecture and a
very specific question on approximation of equilibrium, we believe that the Theorem pro-
vides interesting incites for the following reasons. First, as mentioned in the introduction,
it connects between two seemingly unrelated topics of game theory and discrepancy theory.
Second, it suggests that the question of the existence of k-uniform ǫ-Nash equilibrium for
k = O(1) is probably quite involved. Third, if one comes up with a proof of sufficiency of
k = O(1) for the existence of k-uniform ǫ-Nash equilibrium in binary-action games, then
it would be interesting to understand where this approximate Nash equilibrium in majority
matching-pennies games is located. Informally, note that majority matching-pennies games
have conflict of interests between the row players and the column players: row players want
the matrix to increase the number of 1s whereas column players want to increase the number
of (−1)s. Thus it is reasonable to believe that the approximate Nash equilibrium will indeed
be located “close to” (at least in the relative l1 metric) the exact equilibrium (
1
2)
n+m.
Proof of Theorem 3. First we prove that Conjecture 1 implies Conjecture 2.
Beck-Fiala conjecture implies that for every matrix M there exists χ ∈ {−1, 1}m such
that ||Mχ||∞ ≤ C
√
t. Note that MT is also an α-balanced matrix, thus there exists also
χ′ ∈ {−1, 1}n such that ||MTχ′||∞ ≤ C
√
t.
We set k = 3αC, and we argue that the profile of actions where every column player j is
playing
k+χj
2k , and every row player i is playing
k+χ′j
2k is a 0.4-Nash equilibrium.
We prove that the first row player cannot gain more than 13 by deviation. For other
players the same arguments hold. Given that the first row player is playing 1, we analyse
the distribution S of the sum of elements at the first row (given the mixed strategy of the
column players). S is a sum of t′ Bernoulli ±1 variables for 1α t < t′ < αt. The expectation of
S is exactly µ = E[S] =
∑
j
χj
k M1,j. In addition σ
2 ≥ 14 tα . By the central limit Theorem the
distribution S can be approximated by S ∼ N(µ, σ2). Note that by Beck-Fiala conjecture
we have |µ| ≤ C
√
t
k . Wlog, assume that µ ≥ 0. Then we have that Pr(S < 0) ≈ Φ(−µσ ) ≥
Φ(−2Cαk ) ≥ 0.4. So by playing 1 the first row player receives a payoff of at most 0.2 and at
least 0. Therefore by playing −1 the first row player receives a payoff of at least −0.2 and at
most 0. So every mixed strategy is at least 0.4-best reply.
Now we prove the opposite direction, that Conjecture 2 implies Conjecture 1.
Given a matrix M , we consider the mixed action profile (k±12k )
n+m that forms a 0.4-
Nash equilibrium in the majority matching-pennies game that is defined by M , and we set
χi = ±1 for i ∈ [m] according to the mixed strategy of the ith column player at the 0.4-Nash
equilibrium. Namely, if the ith column player is playing k+12k we set χi = 1, otherwise, if
he plays k−12k , we set χi = −1. We show that the first row sums up to O(
√
t). For every
other row the same arguments hold. Note that the first row player plays a mixed strategy
in [0.4, 0.6]. Therefore, in a 0.4-Nash equilibrium he must be 1-indifferent between the two
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actions 1 and −1. As before, denote by S the sum of elements at the first row in the 0.4-
Nash equilibrium profile, given that the first row player is playing 1. 1-indifference implies
that 0.25 ≥ Pr(S ≥ 0) and 0.25 ≥ Pr(S ≥ 0). The variance of S is at most σ2 ≤ αt. If
µ >
√
αt, then by the Central Limit Theorem we get that Pr(S ≤ 0) ≤ 0.16 which is a
contradiction. Similarly it is impossible that µ < −√αt. Therefore, |µ| < √αt which implies
that |∑j χjk M1,j | ≤
√
αt. Namely |∑j χjM1,j| ≤ k
√
αt = O(
√
t).
5 Correlated distributions
Theorem 4. There exists an n-player binary-actions game where every distribution with
support k < 14 log n is not
1
4 -individually rational.
Since every ǫ- correlated/ coarse correlated equilibrium distribution is, in particular, ǫ-
individually rational, the above lower bound holds for correlated and coarse correlated equi-
libria.
We recall that a dynamic is converging to an approximate correlated/ coarse correlated
equilibrium in t steps if the empirical distribution of play forms an approximate correlated/
coarse correlated equilibrium (with high probability).
Corollary 2. No dynamic converges to approximate correlated/ coarse correlated equilib-
rium faster than in Ω(log n).
The corollary simply follows from the fact that no empirical distribution of size smaller
than Ω(log n) can form an approximate correlated/ coarse correlated equilibrium. On the
other hand, it is known that regret minimizing dynamics converge to approximate correlated/
coarse correlated equilibrium in O(log n) steps, see [4, 9]. Thus, Θ(log n) is the fastest possi-
ble rate of convergence of dynamics to approximate correlated correlated/ coarse correlated
equilibrium and regret minimizing dynamics achieve this bound.
Proof of Theorem 4. For two vectors x, y ∈ {0, 1}k we denote x⊕y = x+y mod 2 ∈ {0, 1}k .
For every k ∈ N we consider a game with n = (2k−1)2(2k−1) players. Players are denoted
by (s, p) where 0 6= s ∈ {0, 1}k and p ∈ {0, 1}(2k−1). We identify a player with a pair (s, V )
where V ⊂ {0, 1}k is a subset of size |V | = 122k as follows: note that s defines a matching
over {0, 1}k x ↔ (x ⊕ s) with 2k−1 matched pairs. The vector p indicates which one of the
two vectors (x or (x⊕ s)) belongs to the subset V .
Each player has binary actions set {0, 1}. We define a mapping f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}k
which assigns a k-dimensional binary vector for each action profile in the game:
f(a) = ⊕
(s,p):a(s,p)=1
s.
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Now we define the utility of player (s, p), or equivalently player (s, V ) to be
u(s,p)(a) =


1 if f(a) ∈ V
0 otherwise.
Note that any unilateral divination of a single player at any action profile switches his
utility from 0 to 1, or from 1 to 0. Formally, for every player (s′, p′) (or equivalently (s′, V ′))
and every action profile of the opponents a−(s′,p′) holds
(u(s′,p′)(0, a−(s′,p′)), u(s′,p′)(1, a−(s′,p′))) ∈ {(0, 1), (1, 0)},
because
u(s′,p′)(0, a−(s′,p′)) = 0⇒ ⊕
(s,p):a(s,p)=1
s /∈ V ′ ⇒ ⊕
(s,p):a(s,p)=1
s⊕ s′ ∈ V ′ ⇒ u(s′,p′)(1, a−(s′,p′)) = 1.
Similarly, u(s′,p′)(0, a−(s′,p′)) = 1 implies that u(s′,p′)(1, a−(s′,p′)) = 0.
Therefore, each player can guarantee a payoff of 12 by playing (
1
2 ,
1
2), which shows that
the individually rational level of every player is at least 12 .
We should show that for every distribution µ ∈ ∆({0, 1}n) with support of at most
1
42
k ≥ 14 log n, there exists a player who receives a payoff of at most 14 (which is 14 -far from
his individually rational level).
The distribution µ ∈ ∆({0, 1}n) induces a distribution ν = f(µ) ∈ ∆({0, 1}k). The
support of ν remains to be at most 142
k. We apply the probabilistic method to find a player
with low payoff. We choose a vector x at random according to ν, and we choose a vector s
(independently) uniformly at random from {0, 1}k . Note that for every fixed vector x, the
vector x ⊕ s is distributed uniformly at random, therefore Prx,s(x ⊕ s /∈ support(ν)) ≥ 34 .
Therefore, there exists a vector s′ such that Prx∼ν(x ⊕ s′ /∈ support(ν)) ≥ 34 . Consider the
matching of {0, 1}k that is obtained by the vector s′. We set the vector p′ as follows: For a
pair x ↔ x⊕ s′ where x ∈ support(ν) and x⊕ s′ /∈ support(ν) we set x⊕ s′ ∈ V ′ (and thus
x /∈ V ′). For all other pairs we set the choice of p′ arbitrarily. By definition, the payoff of
player (s′, p′) can be expressed as ui(µ) = Prx∼ν(x ∈ V ′), but we have set V ′ in a way that
guarantees Prx∼ν(x ∈ V ′) ≤ 14 .
In contrast to approximate correlated equilibrium which requires support of size k =
Ω(log n), for the weaker notion of weak approximate correlated equilibrium where we allow
a small constant fraction of players to have an arbitrary regret, existence of k-uniform weak
approximate equilibrium is guaranteed for k = O(1).
Proposition 2. Every n-player m-actions game admits a k-uniform (ǫ, δ)-weak approximate
correlated equilibrium for4 k = 2m lnm−ln δ
ǫ2
.
4In fact, a polylogarithmic dependence on m can also be obtained, using slightly more involved arguments,
as in Theorem 6 in [2].
12
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5 in [2]. In [2] Theorem 5 they show that
after k = O(log n) samples from an exact correlated equilibrium all players will have low
regret (w.h.p). Here we observe that after k = O(1) samples most of the players will have
low regret (w.h.p).
Sketch of the proof. We sample k samples from an exact correlated equilibrium, and we con-
sider the regret of a single player i for not using the switching rule f : [m] → [m] (namely,
every time player i was recommended to play action j he switches to f(j)). The probability
that the this regret will exceed ǫ is e−Θ(
k
ǫ2
). Denote by gi the event where for player i the
regret is be below ǫ for all switching rules. By the union bound Pr(gi) ≥ 1 − mme−Θ(
k
ǫ2
).
Therefore, there exists a realization for which at least 1 −mme−Θ( kǫ2 ) fraction of the events
gi occur. By the choice of k we have 1−mme−Θ(
k
ǫ2
) > 1− δ. Namely, this realization of the
sampling forms an (ǫ, δ)-weak approximate equilibrium.
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